Introduction
A n international discourse of China-in-Africa has emerged, particularly in Western countries with dense links to Africa, such as the US, the UK and France. While China's presence in Africa should be critically examined, interest in the West is skewed by elite perceptions of China as a rival for resources and infl uence in Africa, and the tone of the discourse is far more negative than that accorded the Western presence in Africa.
The discourse is partly about how China's presence is a "bad infl uence" on governance in Africa.
1 A concomitant idea is that China's activities obstruct Africa's development, a contention that fi ts in a right-to-development framework.
2 A New York Times editorial exemplifi es how the discourse plays out in Western media; its title, "Patron of African Misgovernment," refers to China.
3 It states that if African countries put natural resources in hock to the PRC, China will write them big checks, without questions about corruption or authoritarianism. China is said to engage in "callous yuan diplomacy," enjoy "an ugly partnership" with the "genocidal" Sudan government, and treat Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe as its "favorite," contributing to Zimbabweans' lack of free elections and "sane economic policies." The Times avers that China is pushing the poorest African workers deeper into poverty by fl ooding Africa with cheap goods and lending to African states without insisting on standards that Western states purportedly promote through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The Times also expressed outrage at a PRC company's exploitation of Zambian miners. The essence of the discourse then is to cast PRC policies in Africa as promoting human rights violations or "colonialism."
4 Some PRC activities in Africa do violate the human rights of Africans-not in ways that Western elites claim, but in much the same manner that Western policies do, through disadvantageous terms of trade, the exploitation of natural resources, oppressive labour regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers, all common features of the modern world system. These are practices that China's elites used to denounce, but now come close to extolling as dynamic capitalism. For example, in 2007, a PRC international publication ran an article by Jian Junbao, a scholar from top-ranked Fudan University, on charges of "Chinese colonialism" in Africa. He stated that "more and more companies from China are entering Africa, but they simply focus on profi ts regardless of their harmful infl uences on African society, such as environmental pollution, excessive development and exploitation of local labor." Jian nevertheless argued that the path taken by China is "consistent with the logic of market capitalism-liberal trade" and makes China not a colonialist, but "a successful capitalist in Africa."
5
The discourse should not be inverted by arguing that China's presence in Africa is positive and the West's negative or that problematic Chinese activities in Africa are justifi ed because abuses are shared with the West. The analysis of China-Africa should invoke neither a "win-win" nor dystopic representations; rather, the trees of China's behaviour should be seen as part of a world system forest and the discourse examined using comparative analysis. Our arguments are threefold: 1) given the world system, it is diffi cult to assess the pluses and minuses of China-in-Africa as a single phenomenon; 2) as a player in the world system, China in Africa has more in common with the West than is usually acknowledged; 3) there are nevertheless notable differences between Western and Chinese presences in Africa, many of which derive from China's experience as a semi-colony, its socialist legacy, and its developing country status, features which together make PRC policies presumptively less injurious to African sensibilities about rights than those of Western states. 6 In what follows, we focus on PRC activities in Africa often denounced as harming African interests. We also examine why the Chinain-Africa discourse has emerged as it has and whether Africans agree with its main tenets.
with Africa was merely 3 percent of its US$1.76 trillion foreign trade and less than the US's $91 billion Africa trade, the PRC was in third place, behind the US and France, among Africa's trade partners.
7 China asserts that its trade is responsible for 20 percent of Africa's economic growth.
8
The discourse concerns both China's imports from and exports to Africa. On imports, it focuses on oil and charges that China fosters Africa's dependence on earnings from raw materials. A Canadian scholar has noted the frequent assertion that "Beijing's demand for African oil and other raw materials has inevitably helped to perpetuate Africa's reliance on oil exports and, in so doing, further prevent the growth of more labor-intensive industries, such as agro-business and manufacturing." Ten percent of Sub-Saharan African exports went to China in 2005; fi ve oil and mineral exporting countries accounted for 85 percent of PRC imports from Africa. In 2004, oil and gas accounted for 62 percent of Africa's exports to China, ores and metals 17 percent, agricultural raw materials 7 percent.
10 This profi le is not unusual: apart from South Africa, the continent's manufacturing is largely confi ned to textiles and clothing, which China also produces in abundance. In fact, oil accounted for 80 percent of 2005 US imports from Sub-Saharan Africa; apparel was less than 3 percent, with minerals most of the remainder. Petroleum products accounted for 92 14.5 percent of all oil China consumed in 2006, hardly different from US imports from Africa of 13.2 percent of all oil it consumed, imports that provided 5.2 percent of US energy needs.
14 China imports oil largely to fuel its production: 70 percent of its demand is for industrial uses, while 70 percent of US demand is for motor vehicles.
15 In 2006, China received 8.7 percent of Africa's oil exports; Europe took 36 percent and the US 33 percent.
16 China thus hardly dominates Africa's oil markets. The China-in-Africa discourse, however, represents the PRC as aspiring to be the chief taker of African resources and as interested in Africa only on that account.
17
China does participate in an exploitative business: historically, the price of oil and other globally traded primary products, relative to that of industrial commodities, have been signifi cantly determined by asymmetries in political power.
18 Apart from the "unequal and disparate exchange" that affects oil and primary products generally, 19 oil is capital intensive, creates few jobs, is environmentally damaging and corrupts producing states. People in oil-rich regions, such as southern Sudan and Nigeria's Niger Delta, receive so few benefi ts from their patrimony that violent confl ict has ensued.
20
China is in Africa for oil because 80 percent of the world's proven conventional oil reserves are state-owned and account for two-thirds of oil production. Most remaining reserves are sown up by Western oil fi rms.
21 China takes oil in Africa differently than Western states: it often packages oil deals with infrastructure project loans. China's approach to acquiring oil in Africa is exemplifi ed in the Chinain-Africa discourse by a 2004 agreement with Angola. The discourse fi xes on it because the deal involved infrastructure loans to the corrupt Angolan government, unaccompanied by a requirement to report how the funds were spent. The initial loan of US$2 billion was to be used for railroad repair, road building, offi ce construction, etc. It was to be repaid with oil from a former Shell Oil block that generates 10,000 bpd. The block had been sought by the largest Indian oil fi rm, but secured by China because of its infrastructure loan, which was set at 1.5 percent interest, to be recouped over 17 years, including __________________ 23 a 5-year interest-free period. It reserved for Angolans 30 percent of the value of infrastructure contracts paid for with its funds; the remaining 70 percent was open for bids, although most contracts have likely gone to PRC fi rms.
27
The interest rate was later lowered to 0.25 percent. By 2007, China had lent Angola at least $6 billion for infrastructure projects.
28
In response to the Angolan and other PRC loans, WB head Paul Wolfowitz, the UK government, and the IMF all declared that PRC activities threatened to plunge Africa into deep debt. The US Treasury termed China a "rogue creditor."
29 Africa remains, however, in a Western-created "debt trap," owing more than $300 billion and paying signifi cant interest.
30 Yet, as US Africanist Deborah Brautigam has noted, China "regularly cancel[s] the loans of African countries, loans that were usually granted at zero interest [and] without the long dance of negotiations and questionable conditions required by the World Bank and IMF."
31 For example, a highway opened in 2006 between Ghana's two major cities, Accra and Kumasi, was built with a PRC no-interest loan.
32
OECD researchers have concluded moreover that increased PRC activities in Africa have not deepened corruption among African governments.
33
China's leaders know corrupt offi cials will siphon off part of the infrastructure loans, but its packaged loans are less likely than Western aid to be drained by corruption. As a Hong Kong journalist has noted, because China's loans Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006) . Of course, the fact that China has so far consistently provided debt relief to African states does not guarantee it will continue to do so in the future. and aid are tied to infrastructure projects, "corrupt rulers cannot somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes."
34 A close US observer of PRC activities in Africa has argued that China's aid is more effective than Western aid because much is used for "hydroelectric power dams, railroads, roads and fi ber-optic cables, which have the potential to benefi t ordinary people, no matter how corrupt the regime under which they live."
35
Despite promoting a rhetoric of transparency regarding African oil-producers, Western states have not bound their citizens to a code of conduct. Bids for oil blocks in Africa typically feature "signature bonuses," paid to governments, which often run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Foreign oil fi rms know there are striking difference between what they pay and what host governments retain after skimming. In a rare instance of disclosure, Western oil fi rms told the IMF that they paid $400 million in 2001 for an Angolan oil tract, but the Angolan government claimed it received only $285 million.
36
Angola's state oil company and president's offi ce control oil earnings. Investigators have traced hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and bribes paid by Western multinationals to Angolan offi cials' private offshore accounts. Most multinationals refuse to publish what they pay. Western governments do not compel oil fi rms run by their own citizens to make disclosures, but instead "ask the tiger for its skin" (yu hu mou pi), as the Chinese say, by demanding corrupt governments publicize their own corruption.
37
Western policy interventions have not actually diminished the resource curse.
38 A group of African scholars has argued that transparency is insuffi cient as a means to end oil-related corruption, which cannot be dented as long as African offi cials and the (mainly Western) oil executives who corrupt them tolerate such criminality. Their actions can hardly be policed through the UK government's EITI , because it is voluntary and puts the onus of disclosure on African governments.
39 The NGO-promoted campaign to require fi rms to Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is aimed at mandatory disclosure by publicly-traded natural resource companies, but not non-traded 
40
Western media often cite the WB-Chad agreement to ameliorate the resource curse and spur poverty alleviation as a successful external policy intervention to curb oil-based corruption. In exchange for a modicum of WB fi nancing to build the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline-the largest private sector investment in Sub-Saharan Africa-Chad has since 2003 deposited most royalties from Exxon-Mobil and other pipeline operators in a London bank. Foreign overseers monitor the account and disperse funds to Chad, mainly for poverty alleviation programmes. When the pipeline was built, oil prices were low and multinationals were unwilling to risk building it without WB backing. A study has found that the WB-Chad pact is "a unique one-off event determined by a particular set of historical circumstances that no longer hold." With high prices and tight supplies, oil fi rms no longer need WB approval for projects. The WB-Chad pact is also judged to be very limited in geographical scope and duration and unlikely to do much to alleviate poverty.
41
The China-in-Africa discourse will likely continue to focus overwhelmingly on oil in discussing PRC imports from the continent. American analysts particularly see the US as strategically competing with China for African oil.
42
By February 2007, Africa was supplying 24 percent of US daily oil imports, ahead of the 18.6 percent from the Middle East.
43 The US government estimates African oil production will increase by 91 percent in 2002-2025, while global production will increase by 53 percent. Armed forces in a new Africa Command will be tasked with protecting US access to oil. 
44

US prominence in taking
Africa's Development and China's Exports
China's exports to Africa have also been sharply criticized, as low-quality goods which poorly serve consumers and foster the decline of African 
manufacturing.
49 In much of Africa, many basic consumer items are expensive imports from developed countries, yet because poor infrastructure and corruption in Africa create high production costs, these are often cheaper than locally made goods.
50 Chinese goods are cheaper than both and thus appeal to poor Africans. PRC goods in Madagascar are two to three times cheaper than local or imported goods.
51 As more Chinese go to Africa and compete with each other, prices fall. In the Congo capital of Kinshasa, PRC merchants fi rst sold shoes for the price of US$12 a pair; as more Chinese arrived, the price fell to $6.
52 In Ghana, as more PRC bikes were imported, the price fell from $67 to $25 in two years.
53
If the affordability of PRC imports benefi ts African consumers, 54 there are in any case only seven countries that receive a signifi cant share (5 to 14 percent) of their imports from China.
55 Basic consumer goods do not predominate among PRC exports, but rather "machinery, electronic equipment and high-and new-tech products."
56 A UK government study found that in only one African country, Uganda, are basic consumer goods more than a fi fth of the value of all goods imported from China, and that PRC imports into Africa mainly displace imports from elsewhere and have little effect on local production. poor quality. Many Chinese goods are brought to Africa by private Chinese or African entrepreneurs whom the PRC government does not control. It nevertheless has "in place stringent measures to ensure that its goods meet all the minimum quality standards for exports [and] a ministry to ensure low quality goods are not exported."
58
While most Chinese exports to Africa do not displace existing local producers, PRC exports to the world also have not had the commonly asserted crushing effect on African exports.
59 The Export Similarity Index, a measure of overlap between the value of products countries export, reveals only a 4 percent overlap for China and the whole of Africa and almost exclusively involves textiles and clothing (T&C).
60 The China-in-Africa discourse features a constant stream of charges that China is gutting African T&C production.
61
China's T&C exports to Africa began to rise sharply around 2003, but in many African countries, the T&C industry had long been in decline. In Ghana, T&C employed 25,000 people in 1977, but only 5,000 in the year 2000.
62 In Zambia, 25,000 people worked in T&C in the 1980s, but the number was down to only 10,000 in 2002. During the 1960s and 1970s, many African countries practiced import-substituting industrialization, raising T&C employment to 20 to 30 percent of formal sector jobs. By the 1980s and 1990s however, when most African countries had lost their ability to service their debt, the IFIs insisted that they open up to foreign goods, de-industrializing some countries, particularly with regard to T&C. 
60
WB/IMF-mandated structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were the actual gravediggers of African T&C production. The infl ux of second-hand clothing from developed countries particularly reduced domestic markets for African T&C producers.
64 Kenya in the 1990s, for example, opened up the textile sector to second-hand (mitumba) and new garments from the US and EU, whose increased subsidization of their cotton farmers also shrunk the Kenyan cotton industry, reducing supplies to Kenyan T&C producers. Neo-liberal reforms in Kenya raised the cost of electricity and other inputs, making it still more diffi cult for T&C fi rms to produce at low prices. While mitumba distribution came to involve 500,000 Kenyans, the country's T&C industry, which in the early 1980s employed 200,000, nearly collapsed. Up to 70,000 factory and mill jobs alone were lost.
65 By 2004, even with the effect of the US's African Growth and Opportunity Act, less than 35,000 people worked in the export-oriented Kenyan clothing sector. predictably due to "relatively high utility and transportation costs and long shipping times to the US . . . lower productivity and less skilled labor than Asia, and . . . fewer sources of cotton yarn and higher-priced fabrics than China and India." Their eventual outcomes are also at odds with the discourse of the PRC as gravedigger of Africa's T&C industry. In Lesotho, T&C bosses have been foreign (mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong) and employ most of the country's formal sector workers. In 2006, they rebranded themselves as producers of "ethical clothing" for the US market, allowing almost full employment recovery.
72 In Madagascar, which lost 5,000 of 100,000 T&C jobs in 2005, the industry found a niche in higher-end T&C, held its own in 2006, and is expected to grow in [2007] [2008] . 73 Moroccan textile exports began to recover as producers moved up the value chain and oriented themselves to just-in-time production for the European market, 50 to 60 percent of whose requirements cannot be fulfi lled by an exporter as far away as China. 75 South African T&C fi rms also cannot source cheap Asian fabric for goods sent to the US at AGOA preferential tariffs.
76 South Africa's T&C industry suffers from little capital investment and poor management. Its growing informalization has led to deskilling and compromises in quality.
77 The employment effect of the infl ux of PRC T&C goods should also be put into a wider context. A University of Johannesburg economist has shown that the availability to South African retailers of cheap Chinese T&C imports has greatly increased employment in that sector, which is the main contributor to South African GDP. The increase in retail jobs more than compensates for T&C job losses.
78 In any case, China fi xed quotas for 2007-2008 on 31 types of T&C exports to South Africa. South Africa's government opines that will reduce PRC imports by a third and create roughly the number of jobs lost since 2003. 79 The PRC government also agreed to fi nance a $2.5-million South African T&C training programme and will "mak[e] preferential loans available to South Africa in modernizing its textile industry if it is needed."
80
It is not easy to draw a summary of the positive and negative impacts of China's exports to Africa. Yet, as is the case for the T&C industry, the balance is less negative than the discourse makes out. Its fi xation on Africa's T&C industry is non-comparative and lacks historical context, as China did not contribute to the steep decline in African T&C through SAPs, while Western states have yet to restrict their used and new clothing exports to Africa.
Africa's Development and China's Investments
Most foreign direct investment (FDI) infl ows to Africa come from Europe, along with South Africa and the US. These countries together account for more than half of Africa's FDI infl ows. China had only $49 million in FDI in Africa in 1990 and $600 million in 2003. Its FDI stock in 2005 was $1.6 billion, of $57 billion in global PRC FDI. In 1979-2000, the most recent years for which fi gures are available, 46 percent of PRC FDI in Africa went to manufacturing (15 percent to textiles alone), 28 percent to resource extraction, 18 percent to services (mostly construction) and 7 percent to agriculture. The PRC has said it will encourage investment in Africa's industrial processing, infrastructure, agriculture and natural resources.
81
Investment that PRC fi rms have realized or pledged to Africa is increasing so quickly that it is thought to have reached $11.7 billion by the end of 2006 and includes manufacturing, trade, transportation and agriculture.
82 China will likely soon be a main source of FDI for Africa, especially as PRC government entities offer tax incentives, loans, credit and ready access to foreign exchange for enterprises that undertake FDI activities abroad.
83
Investments thus also fi gure in the China-in-Africa discourse.
84 Even more than with trade, the discourse is narrowly focused, primarily on only one investment by one Chinese SOE, among the more than 800 major PRC enterprises in Africa, 100 of them large SOEs.
85 Western media have devoted hugely disproportionate attention to the Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA) Chambishi copper mine.
86 The upshot of these reports is that "the Chinese" are portrayed as Africa's super-exploiters.
The question of whether conditions at Chambishi are extraordinarily oppressive is considered but not fully answered in a 2007 report by two Zambian NGOs. It argues that privatization is the main cause of the sharp deterioration in Zambian miners' conditions. The report also notes NFCA is commonly claimed to be the worst investor in Zambia's Copperbelt; the Indian company, Vedanta, is judged next worse, and that "Swiss, British, South African, Canadian, and other investors typically labeled 'white,'" are said to be the best. The report adds that "the debate is clearly informed by racist assumptions . . . and a fair sprinkling of frequently repeated urban myths."
87
NFCA's purchase of the defunct Chambishi mine, in 1998, restored operations and boosted employment from 100 to 2,200 (of 39,000 miners in Zambia). employees. NFCA has made it hard for unions to represent its contract workers and it has paid the lowest wages among private mining fi rms in Zambia. There are eleven Chinese, but only one Zambian, senior manager. Mining families had free health care when the mine was Zambian state-owned, but now fi nd it hard to access mine hospitals. Although many miners and their families suffer from HIV/AIDS, there is little preventative health care. The townships where miners live have been poorly serviced.
Until recently, Zambia's government largely ignored conditions in the mines. More recently, it threatened to punish NFCA and other owners who acted "outside the normal" and "put the Government to ridicule." In 2006, the lowest paid workers' wages were increased, but were still only about the minimum wage.
89 In any case, many Zambians fi nd conditions at all mines to be much worse than before privatization and blame the government for having acceded to WB demands to rapidly turn over the mines to multinationals. Indeed, the WB and IMF made release of a half billion dollars of balance of payments support conditional on Zambia's quick completion of privatization.
90
The NGOs' report states that among Zambian mines there is "plenty of poor practice, particularly at Metorex," a white South African fi rm that owns 90 percent of the Chibuluma mine, where it carries out exploitative activities detailed in the report.
91 A Canadian fi rm, First Quantum Metals (owner of the Kansanshi mine) and Metorex have resisted Zambian government efforts to raise royalty rates to 2.5 to 3 percent, to better support education and health programmes. Most foreign mining fi rms now pay what are likely the lowest royalty rates in the world. 92 Metorex, which earned the highest mining profi ts in Zambia in 2006, 93 First Quantum and Vendanta (owner of the large Konkola mine) all pay 0.6 percent royalties and a 25 percent corporate tax rate. According to an NGO report, however, NFCA pays 2 percent royalties and 35 percent taxes. 94 In 1992, when copper was $2,280 a ton, the state-owned mines provided more than $200m to Zambia's treasury. In 2004, with copper at $2,868 and the same level of production, the now foreign-owned mines provided only $8 million. In contrast to the pre-privatization years, these mines now also generally have no linkages that enrich local communities. Only a minority of fi rms run health and education services for employees and their families.
95
The Chambishi copper mine owners are harsh exploiters, to be sure, but it is misleading to portray the situation in Zambia as consisting of a hierarchy of relatively good white bosses, worse Indian mine operators, and superexploiting Chinese. 96 The head of the opposition Patriotic Front, Michael Sata, running for president in 2006, said he would drive out the Chinese, Indians and Lebanese, whom he called "infestors."
97 Sata received funds from Taiwan and said he would recognize it in place of the PRC. He visited Taiwan after he lost the race, while some of his followers attacked Chineseowned shops in Lusaka.
98
The Chambishi mine is by no means the largest Chinese-owned enterprise in Africa. A private, Chinese-owned conglomerate in Nigeria, with which many PRC SOEs partner in manufacturing and construction, has 30,000 employees, including many Nigerian managers. 99 There are several large PRC-owned factories in Africa, such as the Urifi ki Textile Mill in Tanzania, with 2000 workers, and shoe and textile factories in Nigeria that employ 1000 to 2000 workers. 100 Chambishi, however, has been burned into the minds of those exposed to the China-in-Africa discourse.
A comparative study would likely reveal that both PRC and Western enterprises in Africa impose oppressive conditions. It should be noted, however, that PRC investments in Africa are much less profi table than those of Western countries. 101 The WB has observed that Africa provides "the highest returns on foreign direct investment of any region in the world." 102 In the 1990s, these returns averaged 29 percent and have since risen. They are much higher than returns of US foreign affi liates elsewhere, for example;
103 yet returns for PRC foreign affi liates in Africa are low compared to PRC businesses in other regions. Unlike much Western investment in Africa moreover, most PRC investments are equity joint ventures with African enterprises, who share in profi ts. Most are small-and medium-size enterprises producing for African markets.
104 PRC fi rms are often fl exible in responding to African development plans. For example, in 2007, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) banned cobalt concentrate exports. Chinese fi rms that previously bought concentrate quickly moved to set up DRC plants to produce copper cobalt alloy.
105
PRC investments seem also to concentrate less in natural resource extraction and more in infrastructure and manufacturing than Western investments. In part this is because Western countries "ha[d] all but abandoned big infrastructure and industrial ventures in Africa decades ago, deeming them unprofi table or too risky."
106 Only 10 percent of the $22 billion of US FDI in Africa in 2005 was in manufacturing.
107 Some 83 percent of US FDI is in fi ve African states. Apart from South Africa, US FDI in the other four states is overwhelmingly in oil and differences exist between Western oil fi rms and PRC parastatals: Shell and other "majors" have been in Nigeria for a half-century, but that oil-producing giant must import most gasoline it uses, while in Sudan PRC fi rms have built a structure for exploration, production, refi ning, transport and sales.
108 China National Petroleum Company claims to have "provided jobs to more than 100,000 Sudanese while contributing to other employment sectors as the oil industry has grown."
109
The China-in-Africa discourse in the West for the most part insists that the Chinese have particularly positioned themselves to exploit Africa and Africans.
110 Several Western states, however, directly support despots by providing military assistance and legitimacy.
111 China is thus not likely to fare worse than the West in an evaluation of how foreign investments impinge on development and human rights in Africa.
Conclusion
The modalities of trade examined for development implications commonly involve the import and export of goods. However, there is also trade in money and people. Western, but not PRC, banks have traded secrecy and interest to the exporters of 40 percent of Africa's private wealth.
112
Western states trade citizenship for the skills of professionals, especially doctors and nurses, trained in, but now largely lost to Africa.
113 These forms of trade likely impinge as much as commodity exchange on Africans' right to development.
The main problem with the China-in-Africa discourse is not empirical inaccuracies about Chinese activities in Africa, 114 but rather the decontextualization of criticisms for ideological reasons. Some analyses positively cast Western actions in Africa compared to China's activities; others lack comparative perspective in discussing negative aspects of China's presence, so that discourse consumers see a few trees, but are not given a view of the whole forest. Such analysis refl ects Western elite perception of national interests or moral superiority as these impinge on "strategic competition" with
